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COMMUNITY, DOMINION, 
AND MEMBERSHIP 
Lawrence C. Becker 
College of William and Mary 
The argument here is that individualist and communitarian 
theories are not as far apart as they often appear.* On the 
fundamental question of whether to admit, as members of a 
group, people whose presence would damage it, communitar-
ians have theoretical commitments (embedded in what I call 
the dominion argument) that are analogous to individualist 
commitments to impartial, egalitarian justice. Thus, even 
confining oneself strictly to "insider" arguments that exhibit 
a strong form of partiality for the group, the dominion argu-
ment is sometimes strong enough to require sacrificing the 
integrity of the group in order to assist outsiders to enter it. 
Introduction 
Must a family break itself apart in order to care for 
foundlings abandoned on its doorstep? Must a club self-des-
truct in order to admit qualified but hostile applicants to 
membership? Must a nation abandon its traditions and stan-
dard of living in order to admit desperate immigrants? Such 
questions are relatively easy to answer if the group involved 
(family, neighborhood, organization, or nation) is clearly 
pathological or seriously unjust. Its destruction or fundamen-
tal reorganization might then be a good thing in itself, and 
be even better if it helps "outsiders." And in the contrary 
case, if the outsiders in question are making pathological or 
unjust claims against an admirable group, then the rejection 
of their claims may be unproblematic. 
Further, if we consider these questions only in terms of an 
individualistic theory of justice (one that is suitably inclusive, 
impartial, and egalitarian), then even more cases appear to be 
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straightforward- even cases in which the social group is 
exemplary and the outsiders at the door are blameless.' Such 
a theory would have to hold, after all, that we must give equal 
consideration to the rights or consequences for every person 
touched by our actions, and judge the rightness of our conduct 
solely in terms of how well it satisfies all the interests, needs, 
rights, or claims of those individuals.2 In this sort of account, 
no independent moral weight would be assigned to preserving 
existing social groups; their fate would be a derivative matter, 
to be decided by asking how everyone would fare-insiders 
and outsiders alike-under a given change in the rules. If on 
balance everyone's rights or interests would be better served 
by dropping national boundaries, or official languages, or 
state religions, political individualism would have to recom· 
mendit.a 
There is, however, widespread resistance (in theory as well 
as practice) to treating families, circles of friends, and larger 
communities as merely derivative and disposable arrange· 
ments for serving the interests of autonomous individuals. 
And theorists loosely identified as communitarians' have been 
persistently unsatisfied with individualist answers to the 
questions that opened this paper- even answers framed in 
terms of the many ways individualists evince concern about 
loyalty, tradition, social stability, moral character, and the 
elements of a good life. Co=unitarians apparently think 
that membership questions are more fundamental than 
individualists are ready to allow, even for less·than-admirable 
groups, and especially for exemplary ones forced to choose 
between self-preservation and harm to outsiders. 
My own commitments are individualist ones, but like com· 
munitarians, I think these membership questions are often 
very difficult indeed-not only psychologically wrenching but 
theoretically challenging. And it seems to me that considering 
them in communitarian terms is illuminating for the whole 
range of issues that supposedly divide the two camps. I am 
not at all convinced that individualists and co=unitarians 
ultimately differ very much about anything. But if ·they do 
differ dramatically about anything, it is likely to show itself 
in this way: that in some important cases, where individual· 
ists cannot find grounds for allowing a community to preserve 
itself by remaining closed to outsiders, communitarians will 
be unable to find grounds for requiring that community to 
alter itself by extending membership to outsiders. 
I want to explore that issue by finding an analog, in 
communitarian terms, to a fundamental line of individualist 
argument on membership questions. That is, I want to find 
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a communitarian version (call it the "insider's version") of 
the standard appeal to individualist justice as envisioned 
from the standpoint of an impartial, disinterested, "outside" 
observer. In brief, this outsider argument is that whenever 
the activities of one person or group unjustly affect the wel-
fare of others, the injustice must be remedied. This is so even 
if the injustice is an unintended consequence of otherwise 
innocent activity, such as running a city club. If the injustice 
comes from excluding some people (say women) from mem-
bership in a given group, then extending membership to 
them is an obvious remedy. Whether it is also an appropriate 
remedy will depend on a number of factors: for example, 
whether the excluded people want to become members, 
whether opening the group to them would adequately redress 
past harms, whether it would be an even greater injustice 
to others, and whether there are alternative remedies_ In 
principle, however, remedying this sort of injustice may 
require changing the nature of the group in ways that its 
current members do not want, and in ways that in fact 
damage or destroy the goods (as well as the injustice) 
produced by that group. 
My candidate for a communitarian analog to that argu-
ment from impartial justice is what may be called the 
dominion argument. Roughly speaking, it is this (a more 
formal statement will be developed in a subsequent section): 
Communities necessarily have some degree of dominion over 
the lives of their members, in the sense that they to some 
extent determine the thought, affect, or action of their 
members_ When such dominion imposes burdens on 
members, the aims characteristic of community life (the 
goods of community) require the community to generate 
some offsetting goods for its members-if not for the 
burdened members themselves, at least for things valued by 
them as members of the group. By extension, such offsetting 
benefits should be provided to everyone who is relevantly 
similar to burdened members. But non-members may be 
relevantly similar to members in this respect, and extending 
membership to them may be the only (or part of the only) 
adequate way of providing them with offsetting benefits. 
Thus, although many other factors are relevant to the 
decision, it may be that the group is required, by the aims 
characteristic of community life, to extend membership to 
dominated outsiders. 
My claims will be that the dominion argument is genuinely 
communitarian, is sound, and is closely analogous to the 
individualist argument about impartial justice. If so, it is 
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some evidence toward the conclusion that there is not a gap 
between communitarian and individualist accounts of these 
membership questions. 
In order to make good these claims, I will need to give a 
plausible account of the general nature of community and 
communitarian arguments, together with an account of the 
goods characteristic of community life. Once that has been 
done, the dominion argument can be stated more carefully 
and its soundness discussed. 
Communities 
The label community is applied to many things, but for 
present purposes it seems wise to reserve it for an especially 
close·knit social group-one characterized by rather high 
levels of what I will call connectedness, closure, and 
mutuality. Suppose we say that social groups in general can 
be described in terms of the following sorts of elements:s 
Membership rules, describing who can become a member of 
the group, and what level of participation in the group's 
activities is possible for each. 
Teleological factors, describing the group's reason for being, 
and its ultimate or constitutive goals. 
Deontological rules, describing conduct that is required and 
forbidden for members, including entitlements, priorities, 
and various sorts of boundaries. 
Valuational commitments, describing the sorts of mediate 
aims, interests, acts, products, traits, achievements, and 
abilities that are valuable for the group, given its telos, 
and the weights assigned to them. 
Connectedness, describing the extent to which, and ways in 
which, each member is related to all the others. 
Closure, describing the extent to which members of the 
group are related only to other members of the group and 
not to individuals outside it. 
Mutuality levels, describing the extent to which members of 
the group recognize themselves and each other as 
members of the group, make and recognize reciprocal 
contributions to each others' lives, have a common 
understanding of the nature of the group, and have 
univalent6 responses to it and to each other. 
In addition, though the rhetoric is overblown for small, 
informal groups, we may say for the sake of completeness that 
all social groups have the following features as well. 
Generative and transformative rules, describing the group's 
explicit or implicit legislative processes. 
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Administrative rules, describing the group's executive and 
police powers, and adjudicative processes. 
Regulative policies, practices, and rules, describing the 
group's modus operandi in implementing its rules. 
Legitimation assumptions, describing the grounds for 
recognizing a given commitment, policy, practice, rule, or 
assumption as one of the group's own. 
With this descriptive template in mind, and with a focus on 
groups characterized by high levels of connectedness, 
closure, and mutuality, we can say that to live in a commu· 
nity is to live in a group whose members recognize them· 
selves and each other as members of that group; who have 
in common the purposes that define the group's teleological 
element, as well as the commitments that define its deon· 
tological and valuational elements; who share the group's 
legitimation assumptions; who have a general understand· 
ing of its other rules, policies, practices, and history; who 
have significantly stronger ties to each other than to non-
members (a form of closure); and who have highly univalent 
responses in matters affecting the group and each member 
(a form of mutuality and connectedness). They may also be 
(or regard themselves as) deeply interdependent and recip-
rocal across the whole scope of their lives (more connected-
ness); and the group may be, or be regarded as, self-sufficient 
(more closure). 
A good or exemplary community, then, is one that is good 
as a community (good of its kind), and at a minimum is free 
from standard defects recognized by both individualists and 
communitarians. To fix ideas, let us stipulate that an 
exemplary community is genuinely enabling and liberating 
for its members instead of oppressive; that it is just by its 
own standards, which its members accept; that it is respon· 
sive to special needs and changing circumstances; that it is 
benevolent both to members and outsiders; that its members 
recognize all of this and welcome participation in it; and that 
its members are able to see their univalent responses for 
what they are and regard them (in reflective moments) with 
the irony that befits a post-modern intellectual. 
A word about univalence. This is the psychological core of 
communitariartism-both of the solidarity, empathy, and 
conviviality that communitarians extol and of the specter of 
. mindless conformity that individualists decry. Univalence, 
as I will use the term, names only a limited equivalence 
relation. It describes the situation in which one person's 
response to another's experience has the same valence as the 
other's-that is, falls on the same side of indifference, along 
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roughly the same dimension. (If you are happy and my 
response is a univalent one, then I am certainly not 
unhappy, but may be anything from mildly pleased to 
ecstatic.) This is compatible with infinite variety- in degree 
of similarity, intensity, complexity, expression, self-
awareness, and so on. The point is simply that in a genuine 
(ideal) community, when one member's experience is 
communicated to others, they empathize with it, and their 
resultant experience has the same valence as the original. 
The Good of Community 
Consider next the ultimate aims of (exemplary) community 
life. Why would we want to create such social groups? What 
good would they be? Individualists and communitarians give 
strikingly different answers, and since I want to find a 
distinctly communitarian form of argument, it may be 
worthwhile to put those differences as starkly as possible. 
Suppose that what you fear most about social life is the 
danger that it creates. People can be aggressive, cruel, 
envious, jealous, mean-spirited. They can lie, cheat, steal, 
rape, murder, and plunder. Some of them are smarter and 
stronger than you are. If resources are scarce, people who 
want what you have will come after it- will come after you. 
And you cannot stay awake and on guard forever. You need 
help; you need protective arrangements so you can go about 
your business in peace. You need a reliable, effective 
association of people who will help you defend your life, 
liberty, and property. That will take care of your biggest fear 
about living with other people. 
Now what about your anxiety? Suppose your greatest source 
of anxiety about social life is the uncertainty it introduces into 
your plans and projects. Other people's activities- perfectly 
legitimate, non-threatening activities-constantly change the 
range of possibilities for doing what you want to do and the 
relative value of your holdings. So in addition to protection 
you will want some stability, continuity, and certainty- so 
that you can make plans and carry out projects and have some 
assurance that your achievements will have lasting, positive 
effects on the quality and quantity of your life. That will take 
care of your greatest anxiety about living with other people. 
As for disappointment: Suppose your biggest disappoint-
ment in life is the knowledge that you cannot be self-
sufficient- that you cannot get everything you want out of 
life on your own initiative with your own resources; that you 
owe a great deal of what you call your own to other people's 
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labor; and that you sometimes just flat crave the company 
of other people. If that is a disappointment to you then, you 
will want-in addition to protection and stability-the help, 
support, and company of other people in realizing ' your 
projects. 
If you want all of that, then although you are definitely 
a schematic and idealized individualist, you are also enough 
of a human being to dream some utopian dreams about the 
ideal human community. Your account of that ideal-of the 
ultimate end of community life-will stress peace, safety, 
stability, cooperation, coordination, restraint, constraint, pre-
vention, and liberty. It will find negative liberty exhilarating 
and positive liberty necessary. And the kind of community 
life that will be most attractive is one peopled with energetic, 
diverse, autonomous people of good will-people who are 
convivial and unobtrusive, self-reliant and reliable, willing 
to help but not preemptive about it. Your account of ideal 
community life will celebrate diversity, variety, and change 
within a stable, peaceful, and predictable framework; it will 
celebrate choice, personal autonomy, and liberty. It will treat 
mutuality as a means to all those things, and as a source 
of personal happiness. It will regard rational choice theory 
as the pinnacle of political philosophy; n-person prisoner's 
dilemmas as its deepest difficulties; and coordination 
problems as its most intriguing challenges. 
An equally stark communitarian account would look very 
different, at least in terms of emphasis. Communitarian 
political theory does not usually proceed by imagining how an 
ideal community could quiet fears, relieve anxiety and offset 
disappointments. Community life is not proposed as a militant 
response to evil, or as a way of removing the obstacles other 
people introduce into our lives. In fact, in the starkest case, 
the community is not thought of as a good for people's lives, 
but rather as a ground or generative matrix for everything 
that could be such a good. Life in a human community is not 
imagined as an alternative that people in a state of nature 
might choose for good reasons, but is rather a necessary 
condition for the sort of human being who can make choices 
and have a life as distinct from a mere existence. That is the 
minimal teleological effect of community, then: to create and 
sustain a human life. Not one individual life, or a particular 
collection of individual lives, but a way of life-a life-as the 
term is used in the phrase 'the life of the mind.' And what 
guides the notion of an ideal community is, then, in part, a 
conception of what it means for people to live a genuinely 
human life-to participate in a genuinely human form of life. 
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That notion of genuineness poses problems, but the general 
outline of a communitarian account of it is familiar: 
Individuals are enmeshed in a thick web of inspiring social 
relationships, with high levels of mutuality; that web of 
mutuality encompasses all the members of the community, 
making it an organic whole, such that it is possible to assess 
its development with exacting criteria of unity, systemic 
integrity, fittingness, and completeness. 
This is not to say, of course, that communitarians lack 
reasons for wanting to be in communities, or for wanting to 
create and improve them. Without one's natal community, 
one could not have such desires or reasons, but the life made 
possible by that community will also generate individuals 
who can reflect upon it and think of reasons and alterna· 
tives. They too, like the schematic individualists I have 
described, will be able to recite a litany of fears, anxieties 
and disappointments, hopes, expectations, and goals. Since 
we are trying for maximum contrast, for the moment, let us 
put the communitarian posture this way: 
Suppose what we fear the most about social life is the loss 
of it; being abandoned; being excluded; being alone. Suppose 
our greatest anxiety is that somehow mutuality will fade, or 
fail us: that we will cause or be unable to assuage the suffer· 
ing of others; that our own desires and projects and 
achievements may evoke disapproval or contempt in others; 
that we may inadvertently lose their esteem, and love. And 
suppose that our deepest disappointment in life is the 
discovery that what we do and say and think is a matter 
of complete indifference to most people-not that they are 
hostile or disapproving or even ignorant but that they simply 
do not care. 
If all of that is true, then we are going to want a social 
structure in which solidarity is the first virtue of social in-
stitutions, and liberty, equality, and justice are its conse-
quences. Mutuality will be desirable for its own sake, and not 
merely as a means to something else. Positive liberty will be 
exhilarating, and negative liberty a necessity. We will regard 
critical social theory as the pinnacle of political philosophy; 
the problem of legitimacy as its deepest difficulty. 
This sharp contrast between individualist and communi-
tarian positions on the good of community is striking, but 
it should be obvious that there is something badly wrong 
with it. Communitarians do not lack the fears, anxieties, 
disappointments, hopes, and dreams that individualists have 
about social life. They are as much aware of violence and 
injustice, as much aware of coordination and cooperation 
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problems, as much concerned about liberty and autonomy as 
individualists are. And the reverse is true also: individualists 
acknowledge that the self is a social artifact; they recognize 
the importance of conviviality, solidarity, and mutuality; they 
fear abandonment and isolation, are anxious about the 
opinions of others, are disappointed at the indifference of their 
fellows. The difference between individualists and communit-
arians on this question is not over the inventory of goods. And 
the difference is probably not even about the relative 
importance of the goods themselves, when they are considered 
in pairwise comparisons. The difference is rather one of 
expository priority and emphasis, and that difference in 
emphasis is, I think, a consequence of other, more funda-
mental, methodological, and metaphysical disagreements.7 
As a result, I will treat the inventory and pairwise priorities 
of the goods of (ideal) community life as common ground for 
individualists and co=unitarians. And when I refer gener-
ally to the good or goods of community I will be referring to 
the whole inventory sketched in this section, stripped of 
contested priorities and emphases. 
The Burdens of Community 
Much the same result follows from a consideration of the 
costs, harms, inconveniences, and burdens of social life. As far 
as I can tell, individualists and communitarians agree on this 
inventory also, and perhaps even on pairwise rankings within 
it. The differences here are again ones of expository priority 
and emphasis, generated by more fundamental disagreements. 
The common ground, as I see it, is roughly this. 
Restrictions. Groups typically impose special duties of care, 
restraint, contribution, or participation upon members. These 
deontological rules are in principle direct restrictions on 
members, and the gravitational pull of the other defining 
features of the group (valuational commitments, legitimation 
assumptions, and so forth) amplified by mutuality, closure, 
and connectedness, amount to indirect restrictions. Of course 
these restrictions may not be felt as such by members-either 
because they are welcomed or because they are like the 
proverbial locked door that no one knows is locked. And they 
may not actually restrict conduct if they are superfluous- if 
they merely prohibit things members never do anyway. But 
to the extent that they are actual restrictions, felt as such by 
members who would choose to do otherwise and would profit 
from doing so, they are burdens. 
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Intrusions. As noted earlier, in a genuine community as 
opposed to a mere aggregation or organization, people are 
bound together by mutuality-a wide array of reciprocal 
practices and dispositions, as well as affective ties. To some 
extent, they have univalent emotional responses. This means 
that each member will respond, both in terms of action and 
affect, to the conduct and experience of others. Let us call 
this sort of response mirroring, to indicate that it is a reflec-
tion in one person's life of another person's conduct or expe-
rience-a reflection elicited by that other person. As the level 
of connectedness in a community increases, so too will the 
frequency and potency of mirroring responses. This sort of 
mutuality is intrusive, and sometimes very burdensome. (If 
my emotional landscape is going to mirror yours, and if I 
have to finish a paper by the end of the week, I can be 
pardoned for hoping that you will spend most of that time 
at peace with yourself and the world.) High levels of mutual-
ity and connectedness make social life rich, productive, sur-
prising, and exhilarating-when one is in the company of 
talented, fortunate, cheerful people of good will who respect 
a closed office door. Those same high levels can be oppres-
sive in the company of helpless, luckless, embittered people 
who make incessant demands. 
Foreclosures. To the extent that a group is closed, it fore-
closes opportunities for its members-eliminates possibilities 
for wider social relationships. And in general, because 
providing people with a specific benefit often necessitates fore-
closing alternatives of equal or greater value, the goods 
produced by a community will often preclude the production 
of alternatives desired by members. Such foreclosures are 
opportunity costs. Further, to the extent that members of a 
group are successfully socialized into either ignoring or 
discounting certain possibilities, or into finding them either 
irresistible or untenable, then again opportunities have been 
foreclosed. (There is a connection, here, between restrictions 
and foreclosures. Groups often try to make restrictions cost· 
less by socializing members into welcoming or ignoring them. 
But to do that is to iIitroduce a foreclosure into the equation, 
and may result" simply in the substitution of one sort of cost 
for another.) 
Now it is my assumption that this discussion of the burdens 
of community is also common ground for communitarians and 
individualists, even though there may be sharp disagreement 
about how pervasive and oppressive those burdens are in an 
ideal community. Moreover, I assume that communitarians 
want to minimize the burdens of community life whenever 
26 
that is consistent with promoting the goods of community. 
They will want to do this either directly, through an absolute 
reduction of the burdens, or indirectly, through providing off-
setting benefits to members. And I will assume that communi-
tarian political theory would in general regard the reduction 
of unnecessary burdens as a matter of justice. That is, I 
assume that the amelioration of unnecessarily oppressive 
social arrangements is regarded as a moral requirement by 
communitarians, as it is by individualists as well. 
Communitarian Arguments 
Communitarians argue for the distinct ontological and 
moral importance of social groups. They emphasize the ways 
in which an "individual" is as theoretical an entity as a 
"group," the ways in which individuals are produced and sus· 
tained by their particular social environments, and the ways 
in which radical change to those environments produces 
radical change in the individuals themselves. In the parlance 
of traditional metaphysics, communitarians argue that the re-
lations between individual and group are often internal ones." 
These arguments on behalf of social groups, however, have 
a startling consequence for membership questions: Insofar as 
my relations to any group are internal ones, my identity as 
an individual is inseparable from the identity of that group. 
It follows that destroying the group amounts to destroying my 
own identity as an individual, and preserving the group 
amounts to preserving my identity. If this is so-particularly 
if destroying one's group is an act of self·destruction-then the 
membership question is a gripping one. It is very like the 
question of suicide. Thus I assume that: 
1) Anything that purports to be a communitarian argument 
about membership but which does not connect it in this 
way to identity is suspect. 
Moreover, in order to invite the widest plausible separation 
between individualist and communitarian arguments, I will 
make the following additional assumptions about what counts 
as a communitarian argument: 
2) It will give (or be consistent with giving) independent 
moral weight to the community itself, as against the sum 
of individual interests in it. 
(If we do not make some such assumption, communitarian 
theory is merely a disguised form of individualism, running 
a local aggregate welfare operation.) 
3) It will give (or be consistent with giving) extra moral 
weight 'or priority to some one community, as against 
other groups or individuals. 
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(If we do not make this assumption, communitarian theory is 
merely a puffed-up form of liberal individualism, with com-
munities playing the part ofindividuals_) 
4) It will give (or be consistent with giving) extra moral 
weight or priority to the interests of members of some one 
community, as against individuals outside the group. 
(This assumption is meant to be stated as weakly as it can 
be to preserve the kind of closure, mutuality, and connected-
ness definitive of genuine communities.) 
Further, to make the strongest argument against the 
hardest case, I assume we should: 
5) ensure that the argument will apply to exemplary 
communities as defmed above, as well as to less-than-
ideal communities and groups; 
6) proceed as far as possible on ground common to individ-
ualists and communitarians; 
7) consider only conflicts between insiders and genuine 
outsiders (not between different categories of insiders); 
8) avoid arguments that depend on showing that the 
insiders and outsiders are in fact mutually interdepen-
dent and fully reciprocal. 
A word about the final two conditions, both imposed to make 
sure we are dealing with the hardest cases, especially for 
communitarians. 
Gerald Postema has argued convincingly!· that many efforts 
that seem to be attempts to extend membership to outsiders 
are actually attempts to move current members from one sort 
of membership status to another. That may be the most 
accurate way of describing the current situation of blacks in 
South Africa, for example, and such cases are familiar targets 
for standard egalitarian and impartialist arguments. So I 
want to deal with cases of genuine outsiders, not simply less-
than-full members. 
And for similar reasons I want to avoid another response 
to the problem, also mentioned by Postema," which tries to 
build a case for duties of reciprocity to outsiders, based on a 
recognition of mutuality akin to what we have with insiders. 
It is of course true, and a very important and powerful truth, 
that if we can show insiders that their exclusionary policies 
are based on false beliefs about the range of people who 
actually participate in and make essential contributions to the 
group's enterprise, then we have the beginnings of an 
argument from fair play or reciprocity for extending member-
ship. And such arguments are often both correct and con-
veniently ignored by people who want to keep their borders 
closed. Good as these arguments are, however, I think they 
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leave out a set of considerations we may need in the hardest 
cases. After all, insider arguments by their very nature depend 
on the recognition of the distinctiveness and unitary character 
of a given community, and so must recognize the possibility' 
of the genuine outsider-one not (yet) linked to the community 
by a shared history, purpose, or other elements of genuine 
mutuality. And insiders must recognize the possibility that 
extending membership to such outsiders may change the 
community so radically as to destroy it. 
Dominion and Membership 
What genuinely communitarian (insider) argument could 
there be that would ever require an exemplary community 
to extend membership to outsiders, when doing so would 
alter the community in a fundamental way, against the 
wishes of its current members? I propose the following can-
didate for such an argument. It is based on the concept of 
domination (dom:inion). 
I will say that a social group dominates or has dominion 
over people if it effectively defines the range of thought, 
affect, or action open to them, and thus the goods available 
and burdens unavoidable in their lives. The people involved 
on either side of the relationship can be aware of the dom-
ination or not, and be either benefitted or harmed by it. 
Domination can be intentional or not, malicious or not, coer-
cive or not, oppressive or not, pervasive or local, continuous 
or episodic. It can operate in a wide variety of ways-ranging 
from forcible interventions in specific acts, to the manipu-
lation of incentives and opportunity costs, to the largely 
uncontrollable determination of generally available forms of 
consciousness (in a Marxian sense of the term). 
I take it that some such broad conception of domination 
is standardly employed in communitarian critiques of indi-
vidualism-at least in those critiques directed at undermin-
ing the notion of the autonomous individual. The idea is that 
all individuals, as social beings, are necessarily (and per-
vasively) dominated by the social groups within which their 
individual identities are determined. If that is so, the choice 
is not between being dominated and being autonomous; it is 
rather between various sorts of domination. And I take it 
that individualists must reject or at least minimize the 
importance of this notion of domination. Dominion thus 
seems a promising candidate for a genuinely communitarian 
argument. AI; follows: 
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1) The dominion any group has over the lives of its mem-
bers imposes burdens as well as benefits upon those who 
are dominated. 
2) When such burdens are otherwise irreducible, common-
ground assumptions about the goods of community gen-
erate an institutional obligation on the group to provide 
offsetting benefits for its members. 
3) By extension, anyone who is relevantly similar to a dom-
inated and burdened member, in the sense of also being 
burdened by the group's domination, should be provided 
with offsetting benefits. 
4) Membership in the group is not a necessary condition for 
being relevantly similar to a dominated and burdened 
member. That is, outsiders may be relevantly similar. 
5) For at least some outsiders, the group's domination may 
be such that only membership in the group itself (with 
the entitlements following from membership) is a suffi-
cient offsetting benefit. 
6) Thus (other things equal), the group ought either to elim-
inate the domination of the burdened outsiders or to ad-
mit them to membership. 
7) Suppose eliminating the domination would require fun-
damental changes in the nature of the group- in its 
valuational and deontological commitments, processes 
and procedures, connectedness and mutuality levels. 
That is, suppose that eliminating the domination would 
effectively destroy the way of life defined by the existing 
group and replace it with another. (Think of eliminating 
the shadow Harvard casts on American higher education.) 
8) Suppose further that admitting dominated and burdened 
outsiders to membership would also be self-destructive for 
the group-would also effectively change its nature and 
the way of life it defines for its members. 
9) Then assuming a general teleological commitment on the 
part of the group to preserve itself, it should opt for the 
alternative that is least self-destructive. 
10) Thus, if eliminating the domination of outsiders is more 
self-destructive than admitting them to membership, 
then the group ought to admit them to membership. 
That is the dominion argument, and it seems to me to be 
sound. But I certainly do not claim that it is decisive. There 
are dozens of other considerations that would have to be 
brought to bear to assess a concrete political situation, even 
solely from the perspective of communitarian political theory. 
One that suggests itself immediately is whether the com-
munity is using its dominion imperialisticly or not. It would 
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be an odd result if a state could cynically extend the shadow 
of its dominion in order to ground a dominion argument for 
annexing a population of new members-whether that popu-
lation wanted to be annexed or not. Perhaps, if the outsiders 
do not want to become members (or if their desire to enroll 
is itself a product of the community's dominion over them), 
the only remedy will be the elimination of the dominion. 
A Representative Case 
Consider, though, how the dominion argument might arise 
in a representative case. In my view the range of such cases 
is very wide-so wide, in fact, that I do not want to sidetrack 
the theoretical discussion into disputes about the historical 
accuracy of my peculiar reading of real-world examples. But 
a representative and near-enough-to-real hypothetical case 
may help to fix ideas. 
Suppose there is a monastic community whose life of reli-
gious devotion, prayer, and contemplation requires solitude. 
Travel beyond the walls is forbidden to monks, except when 
they are required to work in the fields owned by the order. 
Inside the walls, there is a rule of silence for all activities ex-
cept religious ceremonies, most of which are open to the 
believers who live and work nearby. Those services are offered 
by the monks in fulfillment of an obligation to propagate their 
faith. 
The monks' faith-call it the conformist religion-is shared 
by nearly everyone on a large continent, and is the established 
religion in all of the states on that continent. This religion has 
succeeded, over a period of centuries, in making dramatic 
changes in social norms-norms derived (sometimes rather 
tortuously) from its most fundamental theological commit-
ments_ In particular, it has moderated the brutality of non-
religious warfare, eliminated slavery and the chattel status 
of women and children, eliminated polygamy, and inculcated 
very strong and widely shared social norms governing 
monogamous marriage and nuclear families. These norms 
promote the equal moral worth of all members of the faith 
regardless of station; prohibit infanticide, abortion, eutha-
nasia, and suicide; prohibit adultery and incest. 
Conformists have been somewhat less successful at 
eliminating pre-martial and extramarital sex, and in limiting 
sex within marriage to procreative purposes-having suc-
ceeded merely in silencing public discussion of such matters 
and in eliminating the availability of contraceptives. There 
are thus many unplanned pregnancies. There is also wide-
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spread poverty, in part because families are typically too 
large, and in part because the religious establishment owns 
so much tax-exempt land that taxes on other lands are very 
high. This is even worse for the small enclaves of non-con· 
formists who live on the continent. 
Against conformist doctrine, and despite the best efforts of 
the religious establishment, members of non· conformist 
groups are legally segregated from the larger society. They are 
taxed but not allowed to own real property; they are excluded 
from schools · and from most occupations; they are not per-
mitted to marry conformists, or to have their children adopt-
ed by conformists. Though they are officially tolerated, they 
are regularly persecuted. Yet most of them lack prospects for 
a better life elsewhere, and nearly all of them accept as their 
own (as derivative of their own traditions) the conformist 
social norms about marriage, family, and sex mentioned 
above. 
Many families, both conformist and non-conformist, give up 
children for adoption, purely for reasons of the children's 
welfare. The religious establishment brokers such adoptions 
for its members, and runs orphanages, but its services in those 
respects fall far short of meeting the need. Moreover, by law, 
such services are only available to the faithful. Members of 
minority religions and atheists may not apply. 
The monks, we may suppose, have withdrawn to a hermetic 
existence in part to disassociate themselves from various 
kinds of corruption in the society as a whole (including its 
treatment of non·conformists), and to pursue a vision of what 
they consider to be a pure form of the faith . They are 
convinced that the power and constancy of their prayers, 
made possible by the nature of their monastic life, is as effec-
tive as political action would be in changing the secular world. 
Moreover, they believe their way of life is uniquely holy, and 
that the existence of monasteries such as theirs is important 
to the faith as a whole. They find their lives fulfilling, and 
richly rewarding. 
Now suppose that desperate non-conformist families, 
overburdened with children they cannot feed, begin to 
abandon infants at the monastery, under circumstances that 
permit everyone to maintain the polite fiction that these are 
conformist children. And suppose the monks soon run out of 
places to take the infants. Thus the choice they face is 
whether to take the infants into their community and raise 
them as conformists, or to quietly return the infants to the 
non-conformist community. Taking them in means turning 
the monastery into an orphanage; it means radically altering 
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the monastic community. And it is by no means clear that 
this would be a good thing for the infants. (Would the monks 
make good foster parents? Would the grown children, raised 
as conformists, learn of their origins and repudiate the 
choices made for them? Would it be any better if the monks 
covertly raised the children as non-conformists?) 
How might the dominion argument apply to this case? 
Assume that in considering the infants on their doorstep, the 
monks refuse to use (or refuse to give decisive weight to) 
impartialist principles of justice that cover conformists and 
non-conformists alike. That is, assume that the monks begin 
and end with considerations about the integrity and welfare 
of their own community and what their own membership in 
it requires. Assume further that these monks are sensitive 
to the danger of relying on purely accidental features of their 
own community in making this decision. They are theoreti-
cians; they want to know if there are any general commu-
nitarian or "insider" arguments (independent of the purely 
local features of a given community) that can require them 
to give up their way of life. Assume finally that the monks 
accept the soundness of the dominion argument outlined 
above. How can it be applied to their case? 
It is easy to see what the questions would be. Is it the 
monastic community that dominates the non-conformists? 
After all, the monks have withdrawn from "the world" in 
part to avoid contributing to its injustices. Yet they obey the 
laws, support fully the doctrines of the conformist faith, and 
comply with many social conventions that dominate non-
conformists. They are thus to some degree implicated in any 
indictment that can be brought against the larger religious 
and political communities. But is their complicity enough to 
warrant the claim that the monastery imposes burdens on 
non-conformist families? And if so, are they the sort of bur-
dens that require the monks to provide an offsetting benefit? 
What sort of offsetting benefit, consistent with the nature of 
monastic life, is available? (Wouldn't the monks be likely to 
believe that prayer could in principle be a benefit?) 
Those are all difficult questions, and it is tempting to think 
that the monks would inevitably answer them conservative-
ly-finding reasons for denying that they needed to compro-
mise their community in order to provide relief to outsiders. 
But notice that the difficulties here are parallel to those raised 
by "outsider" arguments about impartial justice: Who is 
responsible for the injustice? What sort of remedy is approp· 
riate? And we know that individualists are likely to put a 
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conservative spin on the answers to those questions too-e.g. , 
in immigration law and foreign aid policy. 
Neither the dominion argument nor the impartial justice 
argument is a decision procedure. Each is difficult to apply. 
Each can often be evaded. The point, however, is that they 
are remarkably parallel, and suggest that in precisely the 
cases (the membership cases) where individualist and 
communitarian arguments should differ the most, they may 
not differ very much at all. 
Consider the range of cases represented by the monastery 
example. The structure of the monastery case- that is, the 
parts of its structure that are representative of the range of 
cases to which the dominion argument is relevant- may be 
put this way. (a) The monastery case concerns a tightly knit, 
exemplary community that dominates outsiders in the sense 
that it arguably generates or reinforces features of the social 
world that control their lives. (b) The case concerns a form 
of dominion that arguably imposes both significant burdens 
and benefits on all who are dominated, but (c) especially bur-
dens a group of "genuine" outsiders-that is, people who 
share, at most, only some of the derivative rather than the 
constitutive features of the community. (d) It is clear that 
bringing the outsiders into membership in the community 
would change the community in a fundamental way-a way 
that the current members of the co=unity do not want. (e) 
The case at least suggests that altering the community, by 
making the outsiders (infants, here) members of it, might 
relieve them of their special burden. 
Many types of cases exhibit some or all of these five 
features. Change the monastery to a family- one that im-
poses on a daughter the belief not only that abortion is 
impermissible but that if she gets pregnant out of wedlock 
the family will take the father and the baby in, whatever the 
cost, even though the family is financially and emotionally 
stretched to its limit. Imagine that the daughter gets preg-
nant; her lover is not ready to marry; her family is not. 
financially or emotionally prepared to take in a new baby 
and son-in-law; she doesn't want an abortion; she doesn't 
want to keep the baby; she doesn't want to marry her lover 
under these conditions. She wants instead to have the baby 
and put it up for adoption. The family· dominates the 
daughter, and (as far as she can think) makes not only 
abortion but (openly) having the child or putting it up for 
adoption out of the question. Suppose she hides her preg-
nancy and covertly tries to arrange an adoption. 12 Suppose 
her family discovers this. Surely this case has the requisite 
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structure. The dominion argument pointedly applies-
pointedly raises the issue of how the family should deal with 
the burdens its dominion has (arguably) imposed. 
Or change the outsiders from infants to immigrants, and 
the community from a family or monastery to a nation. 
Suppose the nation has taken over a colonial territory and 
joined a civil war. Suppose another nation has joined the 
other warring faction. And suppose, twenty years and sev· 
eral million casualties, later the refugees left by the abrupt 
withdrawal of one nation, finding their lives intolerable, set 
sail for a neighboring island allied with their former colonial 
masters ... 
Or change the outsiders from immigrants to citizens of a 
stable, productive nation whose lives are cluttered and whose 
air is fouled by the spillover from an overwhelmingly 
energetic country on their border. And suppose these 
dominated people have no desire whatsoever to join their 
neighbors' community . . . 
In all these cases and many more (e.g., the admission 
policies of private clubs, the use of guest workers .. . ) the 
same structural features (may) occur: a tightly knit commu-
nity dominates a group of genuine outsiders, imposes a net 
burden on them, and is forced to consider the question of 
whether it is morally required to alter its way of life in order 
to deal with the consequences of its dominion.Cases with these 
structural features are prime candidates for both the (commu-
nitarian) dominion argument and the (individualist) argument 
from impartial justice. The parallel structure of the arguments, 
of the membership cases to which they apply, and of the sorts 
of debates that surround their application to those cases, 
suggests to me that (on this score at least) there is not much 
practical difference between communitarian and individualist 
approaches to the membership question. 
I can imagine (indeed I have heard) an outcry of objections 
to this argument, hedged or not as it may be by other 
considerations. Replies to three central ones, however, will 
have to suffice for the time being. 
Not Communitarian Enough 
Objection: We were promised a communitarian argument; 
an insider's argument. One that stood on common ground, to 
be sure, but one that did not depend on individualist or 
impartialist principles. Yet there is nothing especially insider-
ish about this so-called dominion argument; it fits comfortably 
into universalist and impartialist lines of thought. And at a 
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that just typical of communitarians? Isn't that a natural 
consequence of the sort of connectedness, closure, and 
mutuality that defines community life? And isn't it most 
typical and most natural in ideal communities? 
Reply: Psychologically, perhaps. Morally, no. Just as we 
distinguish psychological from ethical egoism, I assume we 
have to distinguish psychological truths about living in a 
community from what is morally defensible about such a life. 
And this proposal about giving our own people more weight 
than others sounds innocent here only to the extent that we 
lose track of the quantifier. Recall that the idea was that 
"For any given situation" we must give more weight to our-
selves than to others. And that is no more plausible than the 
parallel form of individualism, namely ethical egoism. Just 
as self·critical individualists quickly .find ethical egoism in· 
defensible, so communitarians will (I assume) quickly find 
its parallel in their universe to be indefensible. 
The question is really just this: Is there any defensible 
form of communitarian political theory that excludes out· 
siders altogether from being considered relevantly similar to 
insiders? If that question must be answered with a "no" as 
I think it must, then the dominion argument will go through. 
Objection: How can we be sure that that question must be 
answered in the negative? No doubt it is true that many 
modern accounts amount to a sort of liberal communitarian-
ism, in which outsiders are regarded as the moral equals of 
members and in which no one community is superior to all 
others. But do these accounts exhaust communitarian 
political theory? Couldn't a theocratic version, for example, 
declare all outsiders to be infidels and outlaws, and declare 
the existing nature of the community to be sacred and in· 
violable? 
Reply: Such declarations are of course possible, in the 
sense that they are intelligible. And they need not be 
theological. One can take a Stone Age view of the tribe and 
define the class of human beings as co-extensive with the 
membership of the tribe. I can't think how such views could 
be defended philosophically. But I will concede that my 
argument only applies to philosophically defensible posi-
tions. For those positions the argument will go through. 
Objection: That is grossly unfair. Sacred communities are 
paradigmatic examples of the sort of exclusivity that we are 
considering. They cannot simply be waved aside with a snide 
elision into talk about the Stone Age. A closed community 
of faith-whether a cloistered order like the Trappists, a 
religious community such as the ultra-orthodox Jews 111 
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Jerusalem, or a secular utopian community-confronts these 
membership problems. And it is not easy to see how we can 
decide that some of them must open themselves to destruc-
tion while others can retain their historic identities. 
Reply: My contention here is that the dominion argument 
helps us see the answer to that question-precisely in the 
case of exemplary communities. The issue here is whether 
any closed group we can recognize as exemplary would also, 
on its own principles, assert that outsiders were never 
sufficiently similar to insiders to allow the dominion 
argument to go through. No doubt such a claim is intellec-
tually intelligible. I just can't think of a case (including the 
ones you mention) where it is actually made by members of 
the group in a philosophically defensible way. 
Perhaps the point will be clearer in terms of the impartial 
justice argument. Take one of the cases mentioned-the 
ultra-orthodox Jews of Jerusalem. Do they recognize out-
siders (other Jews, Christians, Palestinians) as being with-
in the scope of principles of justice? Of course. Does that 
mean that they recognize outsiders as relevantly similar to 
themselves when it comes to applying the principles of jus-
tice? Of course. Do they believe that their community is 
seriously unjust to outsiders, especially in Jerusalem, and 
that the principles of justice require them to alter their 
community to rectify that injustice? Evidently not. But do 
they admit that, in principle, the question of justice can be 
raised? They cannot consistently deny it. And if the justice 
argument is in principle applicable on this point, so is the 
parallel dominion argument. It does go through. 
Objection: It will go through step 4. But there is still the 
question of the moral weight to be given to the group itself, 
as distinct from its members. The dominion argument 
contemplates something analogous to suicide. It says that 
the claims of outsiders may be so great that the group will 
have to self-destruct. Do individualists ever require such a 
thing of individuals? If not-that is, if individualism grants 
enough moral weight to the individual to defeat a moral 
requirement of suicide-why can't insiders grant their 
privileged community enough moral weight to defeat claims 
that it must destroy itself in aid of others? 
Reply: They probably can grant this, with respect to direct 
and complete self-annihilation. What they cannot grant is 
complete immunity from self-sacrifice and fundamental 
change, any more than individualism can grant a similar 
thing to individuals. That is why the argument is cast in 
terms of degrees of fundamental change. We grant a general 
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that just typical of communitarians? Isn't that a natural 
consequence of the sort of connectedness, closure, and 
mutuality that defines community life? And isn't it most 
typical and most natural in ideal communities? 
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distinguish psychological from ethical egoism, I assume we 
have to distinguish psychological truths about living in a 
community from what is morally defensible about such a life. 
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defensible, so communitarians will (I assume) quickly find 
its parallel in their universe to be indefensible. 
The question is really just this: Is there any defensible 
form of communitarian political theory that excludes out· 
siders altogether from being considered relevantly similar to 
insiders? If that question must be answered with a "no" as 
I think it must, then the dominion argument will go through. 
Objection: How can we be sure that that question must be 
answered in the negative? No doubt it is true that many 
modem accounts amount to a sort of liberal communitarian-
ism, in which outsiders are regarded as the moral equals of 
members and in which no one community is superior to all 
others . But do these accounts exhaust communitarian 
political theory? Couldn't a theocratic version, for example, 
declare all outsiders to be infidels and outlaws, and declare 
the existing nature of the community to be sacred and in· 
violable? 
Reply: Such declarations are of course possible, in the 
sense that they are intelligible. And they need not be 
theological. One can take a Stone Age view of the tribe and 
define the class of human beings as co·extensive with the 
membership of the tribe. I can't think how such views could 
be defended philosophically. But I will concede that my 
argument only applies to philosophically defensible posi-
tions. For those positions the argument will go through. 
Objection: That is grossly unfair. Sacred communities are 
paradigmatic examples of the sort of exclusivity that we are 
considering. They cannot simply be waved aside with a snide 
elision into talk about the Stone Age. A closed community 
of faith-whether a cloistered order like the Trappists, a 
religious community such as the ultra·orthodox Jews in 
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Jerusalem, or a secular utopian community-confronts these 
membership problems. And it is not easy to see how we can 
decide that some of them must open themselves to destruc-
tion while others can retain their historic identities. 
Reply: My contention here is that the dominion argument 
helps us see the answer to that question-precisely in the 
case of exemplary communities. The issue here is whether 
any closed group we can recognize as exemplary would also, 
on its own principles, assert that outsiders were never 
sufficiently similar to insiders to allow the dominion 
argument to go through. No doubt such a claim is intellec-
tually intelligible. I just can't think of a case (including the 
ones you mention) where it is actually made by members of 
the group in a philosophically defensible way. 
Perhaps the point will be clearer in terms of the impartial 
justice argument. Take one of the cases mentioned- the 
ultra-orthodox Jews of Jerusalem. Do they recognize out-
siders (other Jews, Christians, Palestinians) as being with-
in the scope of principles of justice? Of course. Does that 
mean that they recognize outsiders as relevantly similar to 
themselves when it comes to applying the principles of jus-
tice? Of course. Do they believe that their community is 
seriously unjust to outsiders, especially in Jerusalem, and 
that the principles of justice require them to alter their 
community to rectify that injustice? Evidently not. But do 
they admit that, in principle, the question of justice can be 
raised? They cannot consistently deny it. And if the justice 
argument is in principle applicable on this point, so is the 
parallel dominion argument. It does go through. 
Objection: It will go through step 4. But there is still the 
question of the moral weight to be given to the group itself, 
as distinct from its members . The dominion argument 
contemplates something analogous to suicide. It says that 
the claims of outsiders may be so great that the group will 
have to self-destruct. Do individualists ever require such a 
thing of individuals? If not- that is, if individualism grants 
enough moral weight to the individual to defeat a moral 
requirement of suicide- why can't insiders grant their 
privileged community enough moral weight to defeat claims 
that it must destroy itself in aid of others? 
Reply: They probably can grant this, with respect to direct 
and complete self-annihilation. What they cannot grant is 
complete immunity from self-sacrifice and fundamental 
change, any more than individualism can grant a similar 
thing to individuals. That is why the argument is cast in 
terms of degrees of fundamental change. We grant a general 
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teleological commitment to self'preservation, strong enough, 
perhaps, to block required suicide. But if we find that the 
group ought either to eliminate its dominion or to admit 
dominated outsiders to membership, and if 'either course of 
action is to some degree self-destructive, then it must choose 
the least self·destructive of the two, In principle, that could 
be the one that admits outsiders to membership. And that 
is enough to allow the argument to go through, 
Not a Matter of Degree 
Objection: Changes in identity are not matters of degree. 
A community that undergoes essential change is a different 
group than it was, period. Suicide might be a slow process, 
but successful results are not a matter of degree. So if a 
community must preserve itself in order to carry out its own 
teleological commitments, it cannot contemplate any 
genuinely self·destructive act. It cannot accept the choice 
between types of self·destruction offered by the dominion 
argument. It cannot recognize, as a moral requirement, the 
demand that it destroy itself, and therefore it must simply 
choose its own survival, with regret for the burdens its 
dominion imposes. 
Reply: Leaving aside the rigors of the identity relation and 
the metaphysical difficulties of preserving identity through 
change, we may reply this way. The sort of changes we are 
concerned with here are fundamental ones-ones which 
members of a group would consider to be changes in the very 
nature of the community itself; changes that would remake 
the community into something essentially different than it 
is. Not all fundamental change of this sort is complete 
metamorphosis, however. It can be that radical, but it can also 
leave. many aspects of the social structure intact. Thus 
members of a community can in principle face choices between 
more and less radical change, even where both OptiONS are 
fundamental or essential transformations, And that is enough 
to allow the dominion argument to go through. 
Not Determinate Enough 
Objection: Suppose it does go through. So what? It isn't 
determinate enough to matter. It tells us that we cannot give 
infinite weight to our own community; it tells us that in 
principle we cannot always give it enough weight to protect 
it against the claims of outsiders, But that is pathetically 
vague. Allusions to immigration problems, guest·worker 
arrangements, economic imperialism, and so forth suggested 
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themselves at the outset. But the analysis here is far too 
vague to have a determinate bearing on those real·world 
questions. We began with a startling question and a seem-
ingly strong claim. We have ended with an argument that 
supports only finger-wagging. "Consider dominion," we say 
now. "It just might be relevant, under some conditions which 
unfortunately we cannot specify. Under those conditions 
(whatever they might be) you just might have to compromise 
the integrity of your community. Of course, then again, you 
might not have to. It all depends." 
Reply: The dominion argument is a schematic one. Standing 
alone, it gives little guidance. But it does not stand alone in 
this article; it is embedded here in a discussion that indicates 
a number of things about its application to concrete cases. 
For example, the notions of connectedness, closure, and 
mutuality provide a useful way of assessing the solidarity and 
integrity of a community, and the extent to which extending 
membership would change its character. This is meant to 
suggest .a line of inquiry into the notion of an ideal community 
that can be used with the dominion argument. Think, for 
instance, of the ways in which a family incorporates-or fails 
to incorporate- people who marry into it. If a given nuclear 
family is so solid that it will literally disintegrate if a child 
marries, we have grounds for saying it is pathological. And 
then when the dominion argument forces a choice in such a 
case, the choice is between ending the dominion in a way that 
preserves a pathological group and ending the dominion by 
eliminating the pathological group. That still is not conclu-
sive, but it helps. And there is similar help to be had by 
considering the extent and nature of the dominion, the 
replaceability of the group in the lives of its members, the 
preferences of those who are dominated, and so on. 
o Perhaps a better example will help. Consider the sudden 
increase, in 1991, of "irregular" immigrants from Cuba into 
south Florida. The numbers involved (over 1,000 in one three· 
month period), the desperate circumstances in which they 
arrived, and the memory of the 100,000 who came in the 
Mariel "boatlift," raised alarm. The concerns expressed by 
public officials during this period were typically framed in 
terms of individualist principles of justice: the acknowledge-
ment that these desperate people deserve humane treatment, 
and that we ought to be benevolent toward them, as to all 
deserving and needy people; a denial that the citizens of 
south Florida are responsible for the injustice that brings 
these immigrants to our shores, and thus a denial that 
Floridians are required as a matter of justice to take in all 
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such immigrants; and the argument that if we were to accept 
these immigrants as a matter of justice, we would then be 
required to take in all relevantly similar ones-e.g., from 
Haiti, El Salvador, and other places in the Caribbean and 
Latin America. 
The dominion argument, applied to this case, would first 
address the nature of the alarm. Is the issue merely money 
for the emergency phase, or does it go to the question of 
making fundamental changes in the nature of the commu-
nities in south Florida? If the latter, is it the case that 
Floridian communities (or the wider ones of which they are 
a part) have so burdened the lives of these immigrants that 
offsetting benefits should now be provided to them? One can 
imagine that the arguments here will concern several things: 
the effects of decades of effort to undermine Fidel Castro's 
regime; consequent hardships for ordinary Cubans; persis-
tent efforts to advertise to Cubans the liberty and wealth 
available in the U.S. Once those matters are laid out in 
detail, and similarly detailed studies are made of our 
behavior to other people in the region, it will be possible to 
see whether consistency will in fact require taking other 
groups of immigrants. The dominion argument may yield 
significantly different conclusions for immigrants from 
different countries. Domination is a matter of degree; so is 
the fundamental change wrought by various groups of 
immigrants, both in terms of numbers and composition. 
The fact that the contribution of the dominion argument 
will not be clear until it is worked out in detail in each case 
does not suggest that the argument-schema presented here 
is useless. After all, the contribution of "outsider" arguments 
about impartial justice, at least as they are typically used 
in these cases, will not be clear either until the cases are 
worked out in detail." Have we been unjust to the Cubans? 
The Haitians? Have we contributed indirectly and uninten-
tionally, but culpably, to the injustice of the regimes the 
immigrants are fleeing from? In what ways? To what extent? 
Would offering them membership in our society redress the 
injustice? Until these questions are answered, the impartial 
justice argument is also merely schematic. Surely that does 
not damage its importance. 
In short, the dominion argument here, if it is sound, is 
applicable to concrete cases as part of a comprehensive 
inquiry into the questions with which this paper began. To 
ask more of it- to ask, for example, that it provide by itself 
a determinate solution to particular practical problems, is to 
give in to Procrustean impulses. 
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NOTES 
• This paper owes its inspiration to the opportunity to comment on a 
paper by Gerald Postema (cited below) given at the Virginia Tech Con-
ference on Liberty. Equality, and Fraternity, in April of 1989. The 
organizers of the conference, William H. Williams and Harlan Miller, en-
couraged me to expand the dominion argument into a paper. A version of 
the paper was improved by comments from an audience at the University 
of Virginia, and the Social and Political Philosophy Group at the College 
of William and Mary. The latter group, and colleagues at Ethics, encouraged 
me to include more examples. My colleague George Harris was instrumental 
in helping me see places where I had needlessly confused readers by 
introducing the language of justice. 
1 That is, they are straightforward at a theoretical level restricted to 
considering principles of justice isolated from broader concerns about moral 
character and the good life. And of course for anyone who has deep 
attachments to a group involved in such issues, they will never be 
straightforward at a psychological or practical level. 
2 I am indebted to readers of an earlier draft for encouraging me to clarify 
the point that both deontologieal and consequentialist theories are 
implicated here. 
S See Will Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1989), chapters 7·13, under the general title "Liberalism 
and Cultural Membership," for a detailed treatment of the place of plural 
communities within a liberal social order. Kymlicka's concern is with the 
resources of individualist political theory to deal with questions of minority 
rights that relate to keeping distinct sub·communities intact within a larger 
liberal social order. Thus the question he poses is essentially an "outsider's": 
Why should we grant special status to minority communities within our 
boundaries? His treatment of communitarian arguments on this question 
(chapter 12) is dismissive. 
4 It is difficult to describe communitarian political theory in terms of a 
set of necessary and sufficient defining conditions, and thus to distinguish 
communitarian theorists from other philosophers who give communities a 
prominent place in their theories. See, for useful remarks on the subject, 
Carol C. Gould, Rethinking Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1988); Will Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture, cited 
above, which incorporates material from his article "Liberalism and 
Communitarianism," Canadian Journal of Philosophy 18 (1988): 181·204; 
Amy Gutmann, "Communitarian Critiques of Liberalism," Philosophy & 
Public Affairs 14 (1985): 308·322; two essays in Ethics 99 (1989): William 
A. Galston, "Pluralism and Social Unity" (pp. 711·726), and Allen E. 
Buchanan, "Assessing the Communitarian Critique of Liberalism" (pp. 852· 
882); and Michael Walzer, "The Communitarian Critique of Liberalism," 
Political Theory 18 (1990): 6·23. Social theorists (e.g., Durkheim) who reject 
methodological individualism are communitarians in one sense; critics of 
political liberalism (e.g., Marx, the Frankfurt School, Habermas, Sandel, 
MacIntyre, socialist feminists) are united in decrying its emphasis on the 
individual, but differ radically about what to put in its place. Plato and 
Rousseau were communitarians on some accounts; Epicurus and Hobbes 
were not. To fix ideas for the sake of this argument, I will introduce below 
a descriptive template for characterizing social groups as communities and 
make some weak assumptions about what counts as a communitarian 
argument. 
5 Some of the same elements appear in a more detailed analysis of the 
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concept of a well-defined activity contained in Chapter 1 of my book 
Reciprocity (London and Boston, lWutledge & Kegan Paul, 1986). 
6 With apologies to purists, I turn this word to my own purposes because 
I cannot think of a bet~r one to capture the idea of responses that (though 
they may be radically different in all other respects) fallon the same side 
of indifference-i.e., have the same valence in that limited respect. 
7 Some readers have warned, here, and again in the reply to the first 
objection below (p. 20ff.), that this characterization may be false or 
misleading. Individualists tend to conceive diverse goods in the way my 
account is phrased, but communitarians may object to picturing them as 
a bundle of discrete interests or values to be assigned various weights in 
deliberation. Communitarians may be more likely to see each good named 
as a constitutive feature of the integral whole that is their community-
much as we think of the things that are constitutive of a given person's 
identity. It is not clear to me whether pursuing this line will affect my 
argument. 
S See Carol C. Gould, Rethinking Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1988), Chapter 2. 
9 There are, of course, tragic double-binds, in which either course of action 
will be self-destructive. But that does not undermine the ontological primacy 
of the community, nor warrant the conclusion that the interests of the 
"individuals" it generates can somehow come to have moral priority over 
it. 
10 In "Equality as Membership," Rechtsfilosofie & Rechtstheorie, 1990, n. 
3, pp. 155-178. 
11 Op. cit. 
12 See the account of a case like this in Lincoln Caplan, "Open Adoption-
Part I," The New Yorker, May 21, 1990, pp. 40-68. 
18 This canaxd is drawn from evidence that the word for human was, in 
some tribal languages, the same as the word for member of the tribe, and 
that fundamental taboos did not seem to apply across tribal boundaries. But 
of course it is a dangerous business to infer from such evidence that the 
members of the tribe actually held the beliefs at issue here. 
\4 Certain absolutists may believe (e.g., about abortion) that determinate 
results can be deduced from only schematic descriptions of a case. And I 
have heard religious leaders make similarly definitive pronouncements 
about taking in the needy. So my point here may apply only to standard 
philosophical accounts of justice. 
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